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ABSTRACT 
Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles now transport an estimated 75% of cocaine 
originating from Colombia and headed for the United States.  There are several types of 
search platforms (i.e., units to detect, classify, and interdict) being employed by the Joint 
Interagency Task Force South to combat the semi-submersibles.  We use a defender-
attacker optimization model to maximize the defender’s probability of successful 
detection and classification of the semi-submersible through the advantageous disposition 
of these search platforms against an intelligent attacker operating the semi-submersible.  
We assume the attacker has imperfect knowledge of defender platform disposition but is 
aware that there are defenders that must be avoided.  Given this assumption, the solution 
to the defender-attacker model is a mixed (i.e., probabilistic) strategy for the defender and 
a least-risk path for the attacker.  We demonstrate our defender-attacker model with both 
an Eastern Pacific and a Caribbean scenario using five representative search platform 
types whose detection and classification performance vary by platform, and by 
geography.  In each of these cases, we find that our model prescribes a face-valid 
defensive plan; defenders take advantage of geography by positioning at chokepoints in 
constrained waterways, and they provide coverage near attacker origins and destinations 
in the less geographically-constrained scenarios. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Self Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) is not a true submarine, but a 
surface vessel with very low freeboard.  Maritime drug traffickers in the Caribbean and 
Eastern Pacific have historically used a combination of commercial fishing vessels and 
smaller, harder-to-detect “go fast” boats.  The SPSS combines the low profile of a “go-
fast” boat with the long range and high capacity of a fishing boat.  Given these 
advantages the SPSS has become an increasingly popular choice for smugglers 
trafficking drugs from Columbia to the Pacific Coast of Mexico.  SPSSs now account for 
up to 75% of the estimated 600 tons of cocaine originating from Colombia annually.  It is 
not lost on us that an SPSS can also carry passengers, or even a weapon of mass 
destruction. 
There are several types of search platforms (i.e., units to detect, classify, and 
interdict SPSSs) being employed by the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South to 
combat the SPSS.  These include surface ships and aircraft from several partner nations 
and U.S. agencies.  We also consider employing non-traditional stationary acoustic 
sensors.  Submarines are worth considering given the SPSSs relatively loud acoustic 
signature.  Though a variety of platforms that can be used against the SPSS, there are 
generally only a few available at any given time. 
Because searching for a single SPSS can tie up many search assets, current SPSS 
interdiction relies heavily on actionable prior intelligence.  In the absence of prior 
intelligence operational commanders rely on information such as cones of courses and 
speed versus time with consideration for background effects such as weather to help 
determine the most likely routes for the SPSS.  There is no computer-based tool to aid 
these operational platform employment decisions. 
We introduce a new planning aid for operational-level mission planning of SPSS 
search.  This planning aid will provide optimal placement and disposition of cooperating 
friendly search platforms while considering the intelligent response of the enemy SPSS 
operators to search efforts.  A successful operation against an SPSS requires detection, 
 xvi 
classification, and interdiction.  The planning aid addresses detection and classification 
only, which are arguably the two most difficult stages of the operation. 
We use a defender-attacker optimization model to maximize the defender’s 
probability of successful detection and classification of the SPSS through the 
advantageous disposition of these search platforms against an intelligent attacker 
operating the semi-submersible.  We assume the attacker has imperfect knowledge of 
defender platform disposition but is aware that there are defenders that must be avoided.  
Given this assumption, the solution to the defender-attacker model is a mixed (i.e., 
probabilistic) strategy for the defender and a least-risk path for the attacker. 
We demonstrate our defender-attacker model with both an Eastern Pacific and a 
Caribbean scenario using five representative search platform types whose detection and 
classification performance vary by platform, and by geography.  In each of these cases, 
we find that our model prescribes a face-valid defensive plan; defenders take advantage 
of geography by positioning at chokepoints in constrained waterways, and they provide 
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This thesis develops an operational level mission-planning aid to counter Self 
Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS) currently being used by drug smugglers in 
Colombia to move large volumes of cocaine toward the U.S.  This planning aid will 
suggest optimal cooperative placement and disposition of friendly search platforms while 
considering the intelligent response of the enemy SPSS operators to our search efforts.  A 
successful operation against an SPSS requires detection, classification, and interdiction.  
This thesis addresses detection and classification only, which are arguably the two most 
difficult stages of the operation. 
The primary use of this research is determining resource versus risk to gauge the 
benefit of additional platforms and capabilities or the effect of eliminating platforms and 
capabilities.  The goal is to discover the best mix of platforms to use against the SPSS as 
well as their optimal cooperative disposition in terms of placement and the spread of their 
search effort.  Major inputs to the model are positions where the SPSS can enter the sea 
space and the goal positions were it can leave the sea space.  A smaller number of these 
positions implies better friendly intelligence and will result in improved search platform 
performance.  By increasing or decreasing the number of entry and goal positions, the 
value of intelligence can be captured. 
A. SPSS THREAT 
The SPSS is not a true submarine, but a surface vessel with very low freeboard 
(Figures 1 and 2).  A typical SPSS has a hull that only rises a foot above the waterline.  
Maritime drug traffickers in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific have historically used a 
combination of commercial fishing vessels and smaller, harder to detect “go fast” boats.  
The SPSS combines the low profile of a “go-fast” boat with the long range and high 
capacity of fishing boat.  SPSSs have been in limited use for nine years, but they have 
become an increasingly popular choice for Columbian drug smugglers in the Eastern 
Pacific because efforts at policing fishing boats have improved in recent years (Bajak, 
2008).  Twenty-three SPSSs were launched from Colombia between 2006 and 2007 
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(Wilkenson, 2008).  In 2008, nearly 70 were seen or captured (StrategyPage, 2009).  
SPSSs now convey up to 75% of the estimated 600 tons of cocaine originating from 
Colombia annually.  The vessels have been operating nearly exclusively in the Pacific 
making the transit from Colombia to Mexico or Guatemala (Brown, 2009).  SPSS 
technology is easily exportable to other locations.  At least one has been used by a local 
drug gang in Spain (StrategyPage 2009).   
Though SPSSs are currently being used exclusively for drug trafficking, they 
could easily be used to transport any manner of contraband.  Both the Director of Joint 
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South and Commander, United States Southern 
Command (COMUSSOUTHCOM) have suggested that SPSSs could be used to support 
terrorism (Brown, 2009).  COMUSSOUTHCOM cited the delivery of weapons of mass 
destruction as a worst case scenario (USSOUTHCOM, 2008). 
SPSS have small visual, infra-red and radar signatures making them difficult to 
detect by non-acoustic sensors.  Recently SPSS designers have taken particular care to 
reduce infra-red signature through the use of exhaust cooling systems (Brown, 2009).  
Classification is also difficult for most sensors.  Because each SPSS is purpose-built, and 
configurations change constantly, there is no telltale signature for an SPSS.  They look 
similar to sailboats on radar and sound similar to fishing boats acoustically.  As a result, 
an SPSS can easily blend into legitimate maritime traffic.  These difficulties are 
compounded by a vast area of operation twice the size of the continental U.S.  It is little 
wonder that only an estimated 10% of SPSS are interdicted (Wilkenson, 2008).  Many of 
these successful interdictions are the result of intelligence information at the source 
(StrategyPage, 2009).  Our odds of success can be improved either through improved 
intelligence or through improved maritime domain awareness.  The focus of this study is 
on improving maritime domain awareness through the optimized employment of scarce 










Figure 2.   Captured SPSS at NAS Key West (From Brown, 2009). 
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B. COUNTERING THE SPSS THREAT 
1. Search Platforms 
There are several types of search platforms (i.e., units to detect, classify, and 
interdict SPSSs) being employed by the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South to 
combat the SPSS (e.g., Figures 3-5).  These include ships such as partner nation frigates, 
U.S. Navy frigates and U.S. Coast Guard cutters.  Aircraft can include helicopters 
embarked from these ships as well as land-based maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and 
airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft operated by partner nations, U.S. Air Force, U.S. 
Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.  Consideration is also 
being given to employing non-traditional acoustic sensors such as Seaweb (Figure 6), a 
proposed autonomous network of acoustic sensors that communicate with each other 
through acoustic modems (Rice, 2009).  Submarines are considered given the SPSSs 
relatively loud acoustic signature (at least relative to what submarines traditionally hunt).  
Though a variety of platforms that can be used against the SPSS, there are generally only 
a few available at any given time.   
 
Figure 3.   U.S. Coast Guard C-130 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (From Wikipedia.org 2009). 
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Figure 6.   Seaweb is an Autonomous Networked Array of Acoustic Sensors (From Rice 
2008). 
2. Current Planning Methods 
Because searching for a single SPSS can tie up many search assets current SPSS 
interdiction relies heavily on actionable prior intelligence.  This greatly reduces the 
search area.  In the absence of prior intelligence operational commanders rely on 
information such as cones of courses and speed versus time with consideration for 
background effects such as weather to help determine the most likely routes for the SPSS.  
Care is taken to not be predictable in employing search assets, since smugglers have 
demonstrated the ability to avoid known drug interdiction efforts.  There are no 
computer-based tools to aid these operational platform employment decisions.  There are 
tactical level computer based planning aids such as the Personal Computer-Based 
Interactive Multisensor Analysis Training System (PCIMAT) designed for anti-
submarine warfare that can help predict the performance of acoustic sensors.  However, 
 7 
these decision aids only predict the performance of individual sensors; they cannot 
coordinate the simultaneous, cooperative disposition of several platforms in an optimal 
manner against an intelligent adversary. 
 8 
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. NETWORK REPRESENTATION 
We model the maritime environment using a mesh network (Figure 7).  The ocean 
area is broken down into 60nm square cells with a node in the middle of each.  Each cell 
node is connected by an arc to and from adjacent cells unless there is an obstruction to 
navigation, such as land.  SPSSs typically begin their journey from small river estuaries 
or sparsely-populated coastline where our maritime platforms cannot effectively operate.  
Therefore, the entry cells are only navigable by the SPSS (hereafter called the 
“attacker”).  SPSSs typically deliver their cargo offshore where maritime search 
platforms can operate.  Therefore, goal cells are navigable by both the attacker and 
defender. 
j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
i1 Cell Not Navigable-Unusable for both Attacker and Defender
i2 Entry Cell-Useable for Attacker only
i3 Goal Cell -Useable for both Attacker and Defender
i4 Standard Cell-Useable for both Attacker and Defender
i5  
Figure 7.   Example Network Representation.  Each dot represents the center of a 60nm 
square cell of sea space, and each line connecting a pair of dots represents an 
adjacency indicating it is possible to navigate directly between these cells. 
We assume the attacker behaves intelligently, and maximizes his probability of 
evading detection and classification by choosing a directed path from an advantageous 
entry cell node to a an advantageous goal cell node that has the maximum joint 
probability of evading detection and classification along all arcs in the path.  If we 
assume independence between arcs, the joint probability that the attacker will evade 
detection and classification is the product of the evasion probabilities over each of the 
arcs the attacker transits.  Maximizing the sum of the logarithms of the evasion 
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probabilities is equivalent to maximizing the product of these probabilities because the 
logarithm is a single-valued increasing function (e.g., Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008). 
B. MISSION GENERATION 
The first step in determining the arc-based log evasion probabilities is the 
generation of all possible defender missions and their pre-calculated cell-based log 
evasion probabilities. A mission has two parameters, the set of cells searched, 
pmc C C∈ ⊆ and the type of search platform p TYPE P∈ ⊆  (i.e. MPA, Seaweb, frigate 
etc).  We call the cardinally of the set of cells searched the size of the mission.  Appendix 
A lists the types of search platforms, their detection capabilities, classification 
capabilities and the maximum size of mission each type can perform.  The geographic 
models in Appendix B describe how detection and classification capabilities vary by cell.  
The defender may have several platforms of the same type (e.g. two frigates and three 
Marine Patrol Aircraft) but each platform is only capable of performing the missions 
pm M M∈ ⊆ generated for that type of platform.   
We begin generating missions by building all the possible shapes for the set of 
cells in the mission for each mission size.  We do not attach cells in a mission diagonally 
since the attacker can pass through such an attachment without penalty.  We allow 
rectangle shapes of all sizes, “L” shapes of size three, and stair-step shapes of even sizes 
(Figures 8-10). 
2
3 4 5 6
1
 












Figure 10.   Some Restricted Mission Shapes of Size Six.  Arrows Depict Zero Penalty 
Paths. 
Once we have generated all the shapes of each size, we generate all the sets of 
search platform navigable cells that can be searched by each shape.  These sets of cells 
cannot include non-navigable cells or entry cells.  We then combine these sets of cells 
with our platform types to create our candidate missions.  As discussed in Appendix A, 
some searcher types are able to perform missions of larger size than others.  For example, 
a frigate is capable of searching missions up to size three, while a MPA can search up to 
size ten.  
We calculate the log evasion probability for every cell in a mission using both 
detection probability and the classification probability classp,c.  The data and assumptions 
used to determine classification probability are detailed in Appendices A and B.  We use 
the random search formula to calculate the probability of detection.  This results in a 
conservative estimate of the probability of detection.  With w being the sensor sweep 
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width, v being speed and t being the time the attacker can transit a cell, and A being the 
area cell being searched, then by the random search formula (Wagner 1999 p.174): 
/1d
wvt AP e−= − . 
For moving search platforms such as MPA we use the searcher speed for v. For 
fixed platforms such as Seaweb we use the attacker’s speed.  We call /wvt A  the 
coverage factor cfp,m,c.   The calculation of coverage factor for every platform type is 
detailed in Appendix A.  Additional data used in the calculation of coverage factor is 
contained in Appendix B.  Because the log evasion probability is lower when the attacker 
transits diagonally than rectilinearly (horizontally or vertically), we calculate separate 
diagonal and rectilinear and log evasion probabilities. 
 
c C∈
Indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
  cells with horizontal, vertical coordinates (alias c1, c2) [~500] 
m M∈  possible missions [~50,000] 
p P∈   defending platforms [~10] 
p TYPE P∈ ⊆  type of defending platform [5] 
pm M M∈ ⊆  missions platform p can perform [~15,000] 
pmc C C∈ ⊆  cells patrolled by platform p while performing mission m [~20] 
 
Data [units] 
cfp,m,c coverage factor of platform p, performing mission m, in cell c (See 
Appendices A and B) [nondimensional]. 
classp,c classification probability given detection of platform p in cell c (See 
Appendices A and B) [probability] 





, ,_ p m cev rec
Calculated Data [units] 
 log likelihood that an attacker traversing cell c rectilinearly would evade 
detection and classification by defender p performing mission m patrolling 
cell c [log likelihood] 
, , , ,
, ,_ log[(1 (1 ) ]   ,  ,  pp m c p c p m
p m ccfev rec e class p P c C m M−= − − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  
, ,_ p m cev diag  log likelihood that an attacker traversing cell c diagonally would evade 
detection and classification by defender p performing mission m patrolling 
cell c [log likelihood] 
, , , ,
, ,2_ log[(1 (1 ) ]  ,  , pp m c p c p m
p m ccfev diag e class p P c C m M−= − − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  
 
Once we have these log evasion probabilities, we can calculate the log probability 
that the attacker traversing a cell will evade detection and classification given an 
incumbent defender solution.  We need to account for cases where the attacker traverses a 




New Data [units] 
 Incumbent solution. 1 if platform p performs mission m, 0 otherwise 
[binary]  
_ cev recX
New Calculated Data 
 log of probability that an attacker will evade detection and classification 




_ _         p mp m cc
p P m M p
ev recX ev rec X c C
∈ ∈
= ∀ ∈∑  
_ cev diagX  log of probability that an attacker will evade detection classification 




_ _     
     
p mp m cc
p P m M p





C. CELL DATA TO ARC DATA CONVERSION 
We now have cell-based log evasion probabilities for every cell in the network.  
We need to covert these to arc-based log evasion probabilities.  Figure 11 depicts an 
example path from cell (i2, j1) to cell (i1, j3).  As the attacker uses arc [(i2, j1), (i1, j2)], 
he is subject to the diagonal log evasion of cell (i2, j1) for half the arc and the diagonal 
log evasion of cell (i1, j2) for half the arc.  Similarly, as the attacker uses arc [(i1, j2), (i1, 
j3)] he is subject to the rectilinear log evasion of cell (i2, j1) for half the arc and the 
rectilinear log evasion of cell (i1, j3) for half the arc.  If we assume independence, we can 
add ½ the log evasion of the tail cell to ½ the log evasion of the head cell to calculate the 
total log evasion for the arc. 
j1 j2 j3
i1 Log evasion cell (i2, j1)
i2 Log evasion cell (i1, j2)
Log evasion cell (i1, j3)  
Figure 11.   Example half arc log evasion calculation.  The total log evasion for the path 
equals ½ the diagonal log evasion for cell (i2, j1) plus ½ the diagonal log evasion 
for cell (i1, j2) plus ½ the rectilinear log evasion for cell (i1, j2) plus ½ the 
rectilinear log evasion for cell (i1, j3). 
 
1, 2c cd D D∈ =
New indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
 cell adjacencies, or traversal arcs [~4,000] 
recd D∈  rectilinear arcs 
diagd D∈  diagonal arcs 

devX
New Calculated Data [units] 
 log of probability that an attacker will evade detection and classification 




1 ( _ _ )    
2d c c rec
evX ev recX ev recX d D= + ∀ ∈  
  
1 2
1 ( _ _ )    
2d c c diag
evX ev diagX ev diagX d D= + ∀ ∈  
 
, ,d p mev  log likelihood that an attacker traversing arc d would evade detection and 
classification by defender p  performing mission m [log likelihood] 
,, , , , 1 , , 2
1 ( _ _ )    
2d p m p m c p m c rec p
ev ev rec ev rec d D m M= + ∀ ∈ ∈  
,, , , , 1 , , 2
1 ( _ _ )    
2d p m p m c p m c diag p
ev ev diag ev diag d D m M= + ∀ ∈ ∈  
The log evasion on an arc is more negative when the probability of detection and 
classification is high.  On arcs where there are no defenders present the log evasion is at 
its maximum value of zero (i.e., evasion probability one).  Thus, the attacker incurs no 
penalty for traversing arcs without a defender present.  This allows the attacker in an 
evasion-maximizing model to take arbitrary and unrealistic meandering paths, cycles, and 
sub-tours.  The defender will attempt to interdict these meandering paths with an 
unrealistic sensor platform laydown rather than the more reasonable and realistic paths 
between an entry cell and a goal cell.  To prevent the attacker from taking meandering 
paths we add a small penalty to every arc called fuel.  If fuel is kept large, it induces no 
unreasonable behavior on the part of the attacker.  In probability, this represents a small 
background chance that an attacker will be detected by complete accident, even though 
the detection is not made in a cell with an assigned search mission.  In the absence of a 
defender the attacker will take the shortest path to a goal cell, and the attacker will take a 
longer path to a goal cell in order to avoid a defender. 
New Data [units] 
fuel  fuel penalty for traversing a single arc [log likelihood of evasion]  
  
1 2
1 ( _ _ )    
2d c c rec






1 ( _ _ )    
2d c c diag
evX fuel ev diagX ev diagX d D= + + ∀ ∈  
D. MODEL FORMULATION 
Once we have both the cell-based and arc-based log evasion data, we use a 
modification of the formulation used by Ghaffar in his planning to optimize sensor 
placement against terrorist “go-fast” boats (Abdul-Ghaffar, 2008, pp. 14-19). 
1. The Attacker  
The attacker has a single SPSS that can choose to enter a network at any one of a 
number of entry cells c E∈ , traverse a set of cell-to-cell arcs d D∈  to reach (and exit 
the network at) any one of a number of goal cells c G∈ .  Traversing each arc carries a 
risk of detection and classification the attacker cannot control, and the log likelihood that 
an attacker will evade detection and classification while traversing arc d is  devX .  The 
attacker seeks paths that maximize the log likelihood of evading detection.   
We express the attackers’ planning problem with the model XSSV_SP(ev ) : 
 
c E C∈ ⊆
New Indexes and index sets [~cardinality] 
 cells where an attacker can enter the network [~10] 
c G C∈ ⊆  goal cells [~10] 
cENTER
Variables [units] 
 1 if the attacker enters network at entry cell c, 0 otherwise [binary] 
dY   1 if the attacker traverses arc d, 0 otherwise [binary] 
cGOAL  1 if the attacker exits network at goal cell c, 0 otherwise [binary] 
 
Formulation  [dual variables]  
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  ( )max
, 2 1,
( ) max A0
. .  1  [ ] (A1)
0 [ ] (A2)
1 [ ] (A3)




d D d D
c c cc E c G
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2. The Defender 
Discussion 
The attackers’ objective (A0) is to maximize the total expected log likelihood that 
attackers traversing arcs from entry cells on paths to goal cells evade detection and 
classification (or, equivalently, to maximize the joint probability that they evade 
detection and classification over all the arcs they choose to traverse).  Constraint (A1) 
limits the entry into the network to the entry cells, each constraint (A2) forces 
conservation of flow at a cell in the network, and constraint (A3) limits the exit from the 
network to goal cells.  This linear program will produce an intrinsically integral solution 
Y* (e.g., Ahuja et al. 1993, pp. 447-449).  (The Greek notation associated with each 
constraint denotes a linear programming dual variable used later.) 
The defender controls a set of search platforms (e.g., MPA, frigates, etc.) p P∈  
that may each be performing a mission pm M∈ .  The log likelihood that an attacker 
traversing arc d evades detection and classification by defender platform p performing 
mission m is , ,d p mev .  The defender seeks positions for his search platforms to minimize 
the total log likelihood of attackers evading his surveillance.  We express the defender’s 
problem as follows ˆDMIN(Y)  
 
m M∈
New indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
 possible missions [~50,000] 
p P∈   defending platforms [~10] 
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pm M M∈ ⊆  missions platform p can perform [~10,000] 
 
, ,d p mev
New data [units] 
  log likelihood that an attacker traversing arc d would evade 
detection and classification by defender p  performing mission m 
[log likelihood] 
dˆY    1 if attacker traverses arc d, 0 otherwise [binary] 
,p mX
Variables [units] 
  =1 if platform p performing mission m in cell c, 0 otherwise 
[binary] 








ˆ( ) min                   (D0)
ˆ. .                   (D1)
. . 1                               (D2)
1                            (D3)
        
X Z
d p m d p m
p m
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s t Z ev Y X

















1                            (D4)
{0,1} ,               (D5)
p m
pp m
pmp m m M c Cp
c C
X p P m M
∈ ∧ ∈
≤ ∀ ∈






(D0) introduces the objective, and constraint (D1) defines the objective variable 
as the minimum upper bound on total log likelihood of evasion.  Each constraint (D2) 
allows a defender platform to perform at most one mission, each constraint (D3) allows a 
mission to be performed by at most one platform, each constraint (D4) allows at most one 
platform occupy a cell, and (D5) stipulates a binary decision for each platform mission. 
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3. Defender-Attacker (D-A) Model  
We initially assume that attacker has perfect knowledge of these mission choices 
and responds by choosing a path that maximizes the cumulative log evasion probability 
created by these mission choices.  These sequential actions by the defender and the 
attacker are a type of Stackelberg game represented as a defender-attacker (D-A) model 
(e.g., Brown et al., 2006).  The following initial formulation SPSS-MINMAX is a min-
max formulation that cannot be solved through conventional means. 
  
( )
, , ,, ,
,
min max
. . (A1) (A3) and D1 (D4)
d p m p m dZ X Y d D
p P m M p








4. Dual Integer Linear Program Formulation 
A standard technique in solving D-A is to temporarily fix Z and X, take the dual 
of the remaining problem ( XSSV_SP(ev ) ), and then release Z and X to obtain a single 
integer linear program that can be solved conventionally (e.g., Brown et al., 2006).  We 
express this integer linear program as SPSS-ILP. 
, , ,





min                                       (T0)
0  (T1)
. .    (T2)
0  (T3)
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SPSS-ILP solves the D-A problem by choosing platform missions X, and then recovers 
optimal attacker paths by fixing X and solving XSSV_SP(ev ) . 
5. Decomposition 
The SPSS-ILP is difficult to solve on a large scale.  A Benders decomposition 
applies naturally to D-A problems.  The standard Benders method takes the dual of 
SPSS-ILP with X fixed which leads back to SPSS-MINMAX (e.g., Brown et al. 2006).   
We modify ˆDMIN(Y)  replacing equation (D1) with (D1K).  This is the Bender’s 




  decomposition iteration 
kˆY
New Data 










d p m d p m
d D
p P m M p
Z Y Z






,     k=1,…, K    (D1K) 
Constraints (D2)-(D4) unchanged. 
  
The complete decomposition algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm SPSS Decomposition  
Input: Data for defense problem, optimality tolerance 0ε ≥ ; 
Output: ε-optimal defender location plan *X , and responding attacker plan 
*Y ; 
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1. Initialize best upper bound UBZ ←∞ , best lower bound LBZ ← −∞ , 
define the incumbent, null defender plan * 1ˆ← ←X X 0  as the best 
found so far, and set iteration counter K ← 1; 
2. Subproblem: Calculate  devX  using ˆ KX . Solve subproblem 
XSSV_SP(ev )  to determine the optimal attack plan ˆ KY  given ˆ KX ; 
the bound on the associated objective is max ˆ( )KZ X ; 
3. If ( max ˆ( )KUBZ Z> X  ) set max ˆ( )
K
UBZ Z← X  and record improved 
incumbent defender plan * ˆ K←X X , and responding attacker plan 
* ˆ K←Y Y ; 
4. If ( UB LBZ Z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
5. Master Problem:  Given attack plans ˆ kY , k=1,…K, attempt to solve 
master problem ˆDMIN(Y)  to determine an optimal defender plan 
1ˆ K+X .  The bound on the objective is min ˆ( )Z Y ; 
6. If  min ˆ( )LBZ Z< Y  set min ˆ( )LBZ Z← Y ; 
7. If  ( UB LBZ Z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
8. Set K ← K +1 and go to step (2) (Subproblem); 
9. End:  *X  is an ε-optimal defender solution, and *Y  is the attacker 
response to that plan. 
6.  Binary Relaxation 
We initially assume that the defender’s platforms are operating overtly and the 
attacker has perfect knowledge of (“observes”) defender actions. 
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The assumption of perfect attacker knowledge is a conservative assumption, and 
perhaps not a very realistic one in light of the low-technology nature of an SPSS.  In the 
covert case, we assume that the attacker knows the number and type of platforms that 
may be searching but does not know their exact disposition.  In this case, the optimization 
becomes a simultaneous two-person zero sum game (Von Neumann et al., 2004).  The 
attacker may need to randomize path(s) and the defender may need to randomize mission 
assignments.   
The formulations of the overt case and covert case are nearly identical.  In order 
to formulate the simultaneous-play game in the covert case the binary restriction of X and 
Y are relaxed to continuous restrictions (Brown et al., 2008, p. 97).  The resulting X is the 
probability that the defender chooses to employ a platform in a mission.  We refer to this 
probability as a mixed strategy, though it may turn out in practice to by a pure one (i.e., 
all probability devoted to just one mission). 
E. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
We implement the SPSS decomposition algorithm using General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) (GAMS, 2009) with ILOG CPLEX (ILOG, 2007) set as the 
linear programming solver.  We use Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to support this 
GAMS code.  We calculate , ,_ p m cev rec  and , ,_ p m cev diag  in VBA using the assumptions 
from Appendix A with the geographic models from Appendix B contained in Microsoft 
Excel worksheets.  Additionally, VBA uses the GAMS output to generate the probability 
field and mixed strategy figures discussed in the next chapter. 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Typical solutions of the SPSS decomposition algorithm take 5 hours to complete 
270 iterations using a windows based personal computer with a Xeon X5460 processor.  
A typical final iteration instance of XSSV_SP(ev )  has 3,000 variables and 450 
constraints with 10,000 non-zero elements.  A typical final iteration instance of 
ˆDMIN(Y)  has 280,000 variables and 700 constraints with 4.1 million non-zero elements. 
For our scenarios, we use five different representative search platform types.  The 
characteristics of these platform types are summarized in Table 1 and detailed in 
Appendix A.  The coverage factor cfp,m,c used in the calculation of the log evasion is 
proportional to speed of the platform (or speed of the SPSS in the case of Seaweb) and 
sweep width.  The sweep width of each sensor type varies by geographic factors 
summarized in Table 1 and detailed in Appendix B.  For each platform type, the 
classification probability classp,c used the calculation of log evasion varies by the density 











Sweep width depends 
on 
MPA 10 0.95-0.80 180 0-17.4 wind speed 
AEW 10 0.5-0.l 180 0-43.5 wind speed 
Frigate 3 0.95-0.80 10 10-30 wind speed, water depth, 
shipping density 











Table 1.   Sensor platform characteristics. For instance, a frigate can cover missions 
searching up to 3 cells, with classification probability 0.95-0.80, with speed 10 
knots and sweep width 10-30 nautical miles, depending on factors including wind 
speed, water depth, and shipping density in the searched cells. 
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From Table 1 we see that AEW aircraft are better at detection than MPA but the 
MPA is better at classification.  Given its wider sweep width the AEW aircraft’s 
detection probability degrades less than the MPA’s detection probability as the mission 
size is increased to its maximum of 10 cells.  We therefore expect the defender to choose 
missions of larger size for AEW aircraft than for MPA.  MPA’s classification 
performance does degrade with shipping density by not to the same degree as AEW.  We 
therefore expect the defender to use MPA in areas of high shipping density compared to 
AEW.  Both of these platforms are best used in areas where the wind speed is low.  The 
detection performance of both the frigate and the submarine are hampered by their slow 
speed.  The detection performance of these platforms degrades quickly as the size of the 
mission increases.  We expect most selected frigate and submarine missions to be of size 
one.  Though both platforms are affected by acoustic conditions (wind, water depth, and 
shipping density), the submarine’s classification probability is affected more acutely by 
shipping density than the frigate.  We expect the defender to avoid using the submarine in 
areas of high shipping density.  Water depth has the most influence on Seaweb detection 
performance.  In deep water, a ten-sensor Seaweb network has similar detection 
performance to an MPA.  Like the submarine and AEW aircraft, Seaweb is relatively 
poor classifier and is better used in areas of low shipping density. 
We restrict the total mixed strategy probabilities of all platform assignments to 
any given cell be less than or equal to one.  Sending a platform to a given cell with too 
high a probability precludes the use of that cell for other platforms.  A relatively poor 
sensor platform, such as the submarine in a desirable cell, might keep that cell from being 
used by more capable platforms.  These less capable platforms can be useful in confined 
areas, such as chokepoints.  It might be better to employ a frigate in a chokepoint and 
allow an MPA to spread its effort of over more cells in less confined areas. 
A. CARIBBEAN BASELINE SCENARIO 
We choose the Caribbean as the setting for our first scenario (Figure 12).  The 
geography of the Caribbean is more conducive to model validation than the Pacific.  
There are several chokepoints that the SPSS must transit to reach any goal.  Given a 
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reasonable number of entry and goal cells, a valid solution should make use of these 
chokepoints.  The Caribbean is also a plausible location for export of SPSS technology.  
Though SPSS have operated nearly exclusively in the Eastern Pacific, the Caribbean has 
been used as a transit zone for other vehicles used in drug smuggling, such as go-fast 
boats and aircraft.  For this baseline scenario, we use one each of MPA, AEW, frigate and 
submarine platform types.  We assume that we have one of these assets on station at all 
times.  In addition, we employ two separate Seaweb networks with 10 sensors each. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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Figure 12.   Caribbean Baseline Scenario Entry and Goal Cells.  Each cell is 60 nautical 
miles square.  This depiction shows latitudes 08-23N and longitudes 64-88W.  On 
the west is the Mexican and Central American coast, on the south is Columbia, 
where each “E” cell is a possible entry, and to the north is the Gulf coast of the 
U.S., where each “G” cell is a possible goal.  Islands present obstructions to 
navigation for both attacker and defender. 
1. Caribbean Mixed Strategy 
The mixed strategy we select is the probability the defender should adopt each 




search platform is sent to a cell.  The higher probability cells are darkly shaded, and the 
lower probability cells are lightly shaded.  Figures 13-17 depict individual platform 
mixed strategies. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0.017 0.017 0.011
2 0.198 0.128 0.162 0.011 0.017 0.017
3 0.214 0.162 0.162 0.056 0.021 0.011 0.011 0.036 0.006
4 0.214 0.07 0.07 0.328 0.383 0.056 0.021 0.04 0.006 0.006
5 0.214 0.347 0.135 0.067










Figure 13.   Caribbean MPA Mixed Strategy.  Cells with dark outlines are entry and goal 
cells.  Numeric values are search platform-to-cell probabilities of assignment.  
The shading distinguishes qualitatively between relatively high search 
probabilities and low ones.  We have chosen a probabilistic barricade, utilizing 
available geographic chokepoints to navigation.  Suggested missions are generally 
of size three or four cells. 
MPA is used primarily to cover the chokepoints. When compared with the 
shipping density model in Appendix B, we see that MPA are sent to areas of high 
shipping density.  We also see from the wind model in Appendix B that MPA avoid any 
areas where the wind is so high that the sweep width is zero.  The defender tends to 
choose MPA missions of size three or four. 
 27 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1
2 0.002 0.002 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.016
3 0.434 0.441 0.547 0.117 0.004 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.016
4 0.009 0.443 0.473 0.547 0.086 0.004 0.016
5 0.058 0.536 0.491 0.51 0.082 0.007 0.016
6 0.039 0.097 0.067 0.095 0.094 0.014 0.017 0.029 0.072 0.072 0.091 0.091 0.053 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.062 0.078
7 0.058 0.16 0.122 0.043 0.041 0.06 0.07 0.079 0.075 0.075 0.056 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.062 0.078
8 0.085 0.128 0.079 0.126 0.088 0.069 0.069 0.054 9E-04 0.01 0.009 0.049 0.066
9 0.124 0.123 0.134 0.11 0.107 0.066 0.053 0.009 0.009 0.049 0.066
10 0.066 0.057 0.078 0.052 0.044 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.049 0.049
11 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.025 0.018
12 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.025 0.025
13 0.012 0.019 0.007
14
15  
Figure 14.   Caribbean AEW Mixed Strategy.  Here we see much wider-ranging mission 
assignments. 
AEW aircraft tend to spread in areas of open ocean but still use these open ocean 
areas to cover the chokepoints.  Most suggested missions are of size nine or ten.  
Checking the shipping density and wind models in Appendix B reveals that the defender 
AEW aircraft avoid areas with high shipping density and high winds with a few 
exceptions that merely allow assignment of attractive larger mission sizes. 
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Figure 15.   Caribbean Frigate Mixed Strategy. 
The frigate is used in a few constrained areas, but there is also a tendency to avoid 
areas that may be better used by other platforms.  When comparing to the shipping 
density and acoustic condition models in Appendix B, we see that all of the cells chosen 
are of moderate or high shipping density and all have moderate to good acoustic 
conditions.  All but one of the frigate missions suggested for the defender are of size one. 
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Figure 16.   Caribbean Submarine Mixed Strategy. 
When comparing to the shipping density and acoustic condition models in 
Appendix B, we see that all of the cells chosen are of low shipping density and all have 
moderate to good acoustic conditions.  The most likely missions chosen for the 
submarine are of size one. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0.709 0.506 0.069 0.01
2 0.073 0.073 0.627 0.438 0.041 0.014
3 0.031 0.292 0.292 0.031 0.073 0.7 0.411 0.027 0.041 0.014
4 0.261 0.7 0.484
5
6 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.097 0.348 0.504 0.388
7 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.124 0.259 0.384 0.504
8 0.029 0.029 0.067 0.039 0.052 0.063 0.035 0.033 0.024 0.032 0.043
9 0.031 0.14 0.168 0.249 0.25 0.242 0.242 0.233 0.227 0.219 0.17 0.154 0.067
10 8E-04 8E-04 0.024 0.106 0.106 0.071 0.043 0.002 0.005 0.032 0.043
11 8E-04 0.051 0.05 0.04 0.016 0.012




Figure 17.   Caribbean Seaweb Mixed Strategy. 
Checking the depth model in Appendix B reveals advantageous placement of  
Seaweb in  deep water to cover the entry cells as well as the eastern goal cells.  The 
chokepoints are too shallow for Seaweb to be used effectively.  Examining the shipping 
density model in Appendix B reveals that we suggest placing Seaweb in areas of high 
shipping density only when the water is deep and the cell is part of a larger mission in a 
desirable area for search.  The size of the missions chosen by the defender vary by water 
depth.  The larger mission sizes are in deeper water. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0.017 0.726 0.518 0.069 0.01
2 0.198 0.128 0.162 0.002 0.002 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.099 0.11 1 0.455 0.041 0.014 0.016
3 0.214 0.465 0.895 1 0.148 0.004 0.082 0.047 0.026 0.115 0.199 0.711 0.504 0.033 0.041 0.03
4 0.223 0.443 0.473 0.931 0.155 0.004 0.328 0.383 0.056 1 0.523 0.006 0.006 0.016
5 0.272 0.536 0.491 0.51 0.082 0.007 0.419 0.497 0.084
6 0.055 0.097 0.067 0.095 0.094 0.014 0.017 0.029 0.072 0.072 0.111 0.143 0.057 0.002 0.107 0.205 0.36 1 1
7 0.058 0.16 0.122 0.043 0.043 0.06 0.07 0.079 0.075 0.075 0.06 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.136 0.271 0.446 0.582
8 0.227 0.128 0.079 0.137 0.088 0.069 0.098 0.083 0.068 0.049 0.061 0.063 0.035 0.033 0.024 0.032 0.043 0.049 0.066
9 0.124 0.123 0.163 0.11 0.137 0.206 0.221 0.249 0.25 0.251 0.262 0.233 0.227 0.219 0.17 0.154 0.116 0.066
10 0.066 0.057 0.081 0.052 0.068 0.119 0.106 0.071 0.043 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.032 0.043 0.049 0.049
11 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.076 0.068 0.04 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.012
12 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.032 0.076 0.066 0.04
13 0.046 0.019 0.007
14 0.013
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Figure 18.   Overall Mixed Strategy.  This reminds us that the prior, platform-by-platform 
mixed strategies are, in fact, an orchestrated, simultaneous, coordinated, joint 
employment plan for all of them.  Over time this shows how we suggest all the 
platforms be assigned.  
Figure 18 depicts the overall mixed strategy.  This shows where the defender 
chooses to send all assets.  A cell is saturated if the total mixed strategy probability for all 
defenders equals 1.0.  We see the defender saturates the easternmost chokepoint with 
search platforms. 
2. Caribbean Probability Field 
We combine the mixed strategy with sensor performance to create the probability 
field in Figure 19.  More darkly shaded cells have a high probability of detection and 
classification that the attacker wishes to avoid.  The numbers in the probability field cells 
are based on a rectilinear transit.  The probabilities based on a diagonal transit are higher 
but the relative strength of these probabilities from cell to cell is similar for rectilinear 
and diagonal transits. 
The path depicted by the arrow is the worst-case attacker path from the defender’s 
point of view.  The probability of detection and classification given this path is 
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approximately 0.69.  Any other path taken by the attacker results in a higher probability 
of detection and classification.  Of course, the attacker cannot always take this worst-case 
path.  If the attacker always used this worst case path, the defender would be able to 
defend against this one path rather than all possible paths. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0.009 0.222 0.148 0.032 0.005
2 0.111 0.1 0.135 8E-04 8E-04 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.037 0.043 0.23 0.123 0.013 0.005 0.009
3 0.188 0.232 0.311 0.491 0.067 0.002 0.061 0.04 0.013 0.029 0.038 0.254 0.09 0.017 0.016 0.014
4 0.188 0.206 0.219 0.261 0.078 9E-04 0.445 0.251 0.05 0.253 0.098 0.002 0.003 0.009
5 0.285 0.243 0.226 0.231 0.04 0.004 0.393 0.315 0.077
6 0.042 0.048 0.033 0.046 0.045 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.023 0.035 0.076 0.072 0.027 3E-04 0.136 0.173 0.091 0.3 0.271
7 0.011 0.047 0.032 0.011 0.014 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.015 8E-04 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.033 0.073 0.14 0.183
8 0.09 0.062 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.033 0.038 0.031 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.024 0.033
9 0.06 0.059 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.054 0.044 0.043 0.041 0.033 0.04 0.04 0.041 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.033
10 0.032 0.029 0.024 0.017 0.025 0.024 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.002 4E-04 6E-04 0.007 0.011 0.024 0.024
11 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.019 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.002 6E-04 0.002
12 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.019 0.01 0.003
13 0.027 0.009 0.002
14 0.003
15  
Figure 19.   Caribbean Probability Field and Worst-Case Attacker Path. 
B. PACIFIC BASELINE SCENARIO 
The Pacific is a more realistic setting than the Caribbean in that drug cartels 
currently use large numbers SPSSs here.  There are no chokepoints, but there are fewer 
entry cells than goals cells (Figure 20).  Unless there is a marked difference in 
environmental conditions between the areas bordering entry and goal cells, we expect the 
defender to concentrate his assets to cover the area surrounding entry cells.  As in the 
Caribbean, the defender has one MPA, one AEW aircraft, one frigate, one submarine, and 
































Figure 20.   Pacific Baseline Scenario Entry and Goal Cells.  Each cell is a 60 nautical 
mile square.  At the lower right (south-east) is the coast of Columbia with entry 
cells “E”, while at the upper left (north-west) is the coast of Mexico with goal 
cells “G”. 
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1. Pacific Mixed Strategy 













13 0 0.01 0.01
14 0.01 0.53 0.51 0.37 0.37
15 0.01 0.33 0.31 0.4 0.17
16 0.13 0.13 0.23
17 0.23








Figure 21.   Pacific MPA Mixed Strategy.  We see that in this case the suggested 
probabilistic barrier covers the entry cells. 
MPA is used primarily to cover the entry points. When compared to the shipping 
density model in Appendix B, we see that MPA cover nearly all the high shipping density 
cells in the vicinity of the entry cells.  We also see from the wind model in Appendix B 
that MPA avoids any areas where the expected wind is 20 knots or higher.  The only high 
shipping density cell in the vicinity of the entry cells not covered by MPA has 20-knot 
winds.  Due to lower winds and wider sweep widths, we preferentially choose MPA 
missions of larger size in the Pacific.   
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14 0.01 0.08 0.06
15 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.64 0.58 0.1 0.12 0.12
16 0 0 0.02 0.05 0.76 0.74 0.2 0.2 0.16
17 0 0 0.04 0.79 0.86 0.25 0.1 0.08
18 0 0 0.72 0.73 0.18 0.09
19 0 0 0.02 0.7 0.72 0.13
20 0 0 0.14 0.14





Figure 22.   Pacific AEW Mixed Strategy.  Similar to MPA, AEW aircraft concentrate 
their search effort near the entry cells. 
As with MPA, AEW aircraft are better used to cover the entry points.  As in the 
Caribbean, we prefer mission sizes of nine or ten.  Checking the shipping density and 
wind models in Appendix B reveals that the defender AEW aircraft avoid areas with high 
shipping density and high winds with exception of i15, j25.  Choosing this cell allows 
AEW defender to fit a mission with larger mission size within a relatively constrained 
navigable area.  
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Figure 23.   Pacific Frigate Mixed Strategy. 
The frigate avoids areas that may be better used by other platforms and 
preferentially searches relatively constrained areas.  From the acoustic model in 
Appendix B we see that the cells chosen by the defender have good acoustic conditions.  
Every frigate mission we suggest is of size one. 
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Figure 24.   Pacific Submarine Mixed Strategy. 
Checking the shipping density and acoustic condition models in Appendix B 
reveals that all of the cells suggested are of low to moderate shipping density and have 
moderate to good acoustic conditions.  The submarine missions chosen are of size one or 
two. 
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6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
8 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01
9 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0
10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
11 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.33
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.27 0.42 0.71
16 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.3 0.45 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.8
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.05 0.52 0.9
18 0 0 0 0.03 0.28 0.62 0.23 0.25 0.28
19 0 0 0 0.01 0.13 0.42 0.23 0.06






Figure 25.   Pacific Seaweb Mixed Strategy.  The overall, blended operational plan 
concentrates search effort near the entry cells.  The shaded cells with “0” 
probability have non-zero probabilities too small to display.  
Checking the depth model in Appendix B reveals we select a mixed strategy for 
Seaweb that closely matches the depth contours.  Unlike the other sensor platforms, we 
devote some Seaweb effort to cover areas in the vicinity of goal cells.  These areas are in 
deep water.  Comparing with the shipping density model in Appendix B shows we only 
choose to use Seaweb in areas of moderate to low shipping density.  The size of the 
missions suggested vary by water depth.  The larger mission sizes are in deep water. 
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6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01
8 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02
9 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0
10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
11 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.05 0.01
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.53 0.51 0.37 1
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.31 0.51 0.97 0.89 0.5 1 0.12
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.32 0.5 0.94 0.88 0.44 1 0.16
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.3 0.64 0.99 0.91 1 1 0.08
18 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.28 0.62 0.95 1 1 0.31
19 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.13 0.44 0.93 1 1
20 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.31 0.52 1
21 0 0 0.02 0.5 0.84




Figure 26.   Pacific Overall Mixed Strategy.  We suggest a mixed strategy that is a 
blockade of entry cells in Columbia. 
We see in the overall mixed strategy that we suggest a probabilistic blockade in 
the immediate vicinity of entry cells. 
2. Pacific Probability Field 
We combine the mixed strategy of Figures 21-26 with sensor performance 
calculations to create the probability field in Figure 27.  The path depicted by the arrow is 
the worst-case attacker path from the defender’s point of view.  The probability of 
detection and classification given this path is approximately 0.86.  This probability is 





6 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.01
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.33 0.32 0.3 0.58
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.4 0.32 0.3 0.41 0.07
16 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.31 0.44 0.29 0.35 0.08
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.07 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.31 0.04
18 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.37 0.42 0.51 0.27
19 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.08 0.35 0.37 0.62
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.3 0.4
21 0 0 0.01 0.11 0.09




Figure 27.   Pacific Probability Field and Worst-Case Attacker Path. 
C. RESOURCES VERSUS RISK 
We now explore the effect of removing MPA on the Baseline mixed strategy in 
the Caribbean (Figures 28-32).  With the removal of MPA the defender adjusts the mixed 
strategy by using the AEW aircraft and Seaweb to cover the open ocean area between the 
entry cells and the two western chokepoints.  These areas have low to moderate shipping 
densities that allow AEW aircraft and Seaweb to operate effectively (see Appendix B for 
shipping density and depth models).  The westernmost chokepoint with high shipping 
densities now has no direct coverage.  Similarly the defender deploys Seaweb to cover 
the eastern approaches to the goal cells by deploying in deep water in columns j21 and 
j22.  The frigate strategy complements Seaweb in these columns by covering high 
shipping density cells. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1
2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 6E-04
3 0.002 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 6E-04
4 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.022 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 6E-04
5 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.009 1E-04 1E-04 6E-04
6 0.008 0.008 0.027 0.059 0.054 0.072 0.106 0.206 0.206 0.288 0.288 0.163 0.057 0.058
7 0.008 0.054 0.081 0.074 0.118 0.159 0.204 0.243 0.243 0.228 0.185 0.008 0.008 0.057 0.058
8 0.054 0.247 0.235 0.377 0.275 0.223 0.157 0.119 0.044 0.052 0.008 0.057 0.058
9 0.349 0.364 0.481 0.369 0.35 0.126 0.099 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058
10 0.275 0.265 0.35 0.223 0.147 0.029 0.006 0.014 0.052 0.044 0.057 0.058
11 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.03 0.056 0.028 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 6E-04
12 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.056 0.053 0.006 0.006
13 0.028 0.058 0.031
14
15  
Figure 28.   AEW Mixed Strategy for Caribbean Scenario with no MPA. 
 
 

















Figure 29.   Frigate Mixed Strategy for Caribbean Scenario with no MPA. 
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Figure 30.   Submarine Mixed Strategy for Caribbean Scenario with no MPA. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0.706 0.565 0.073 0.014
2 0.034 0.055 0.68 0.503 0.047 0.014
3 0.002 0.037 0.037 0.034 0.694 0.505 0.035 0.016 0.014
4 0.032 0.037 0.007 0.661 0.506 0.002 0.002
5 0.03 0.03
6 0.023 0.023 0.179 0.179 0.035 0.035 0.003 0.003
7 0.149 0.179 0.03 0.026 0.026 0.041 0.015 0.044 0.068 0.003 0.003
8 0.255 0.255 0.286 0.211 0.092 0.157 0.127 0.131 0.094 0.132 0.118 0.003
9 0.014 0.596 0.641 0.726 0.681 0.485 0.584 0.575 0.538 0.465 0.31 0.2 0.029 0.032
10 0.01 0.01 0.027 0.296 0.344 0.245 0.139 0.003 0.003 0.032 0.065 0.087 0.003
11 0.01 0.037 0.173 0.236 0.066 0.052





Figure 31.   Seaweb Mixed Strategy for Caribbean Scenario with no MPA. 
 43 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0.706 0.565 0.073 0.014
2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.044 0.132 1 0.503 0.047 0.014 6E-04
3 0.003 0.047 0.047 0.011 0.002 0.023 0.01 0.01 0.075 0.235 0.694 0.606 0.035 0.016 0.014
4 0.033 0.039 0.019 0.022 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.004 1 0.506 0.002 0.002 6E-04
5 0.038 0.038 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.009 1E-04 1E-04 0.16 0.063 6E-04
6 0.023 0.023 0.008 0.008 0.027 0.059 0.054 0.072 0.106 0.206 0.206 0.288 0.646 0.343 0.035 0.035 0.06 0.06
7 0.008 0.054 0.081 0.074 0.118 0.159 0.204 0.243 0.243 0.377 0.364 0.038 0.034 0.026 0.041 0.015 0.044 0.068 0.06 0.061
8 0.292 0.247 0.235 0.441 0.275 0.223 0.412 0.374 0.286 0.255 0.143 0.165 0.127 0.131 0.094 0.132 0.118 0.057 0.061
9 0.349 0.364 0.58 0.369 0.364 0.722 0.74 0.726 0.681 0.543 0.648 0.575 0.538 0.465 0.31 0.2 0.086 0.089
10 0.275 0.265 0.36 0.233 0.174 0.325 0.344 0.245 0.145 0.017 0.052 0.044 0.018 0.106 0.065 0.087 0.057 0.061
11 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.04 0.094 0.201 0.236 0.071 0.058 0.008 0.008 0.103 0.035 6E-04
12 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.123 0.236 0.179 0.006





Next, to assess the contribution of each platform type, we successively remove 
each platform type from each region.  The results are summarized in Figures 33 and 34.  
In both regions, we see that removing the MPA has the biggest impact, followed by 
AEW, Seaweb, frigate and submarine.  Given the MPA’s effectiveness at both detection 
and classification it is not surprising that removing the MPA has the biggest impact.  The 
effect of removing the frigate has almost as significant an impact as removing Seaweb in 
the Pacific.  This gap in impact between the frigate and Seaweb is much greater in the 
Caribbean.  The availability and location of deep water is the likely reason.  We see in 
Appendix B that the area adjacent to the entry cells in the Pacific is relatively shallow.  
This makes Seaweb a less effective detection sensor in an area that would otherwise be 
an attractive location for Seaweb deployment. 
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Figure 32.   Caribbean Resources Versus Risk.  Each bar shows the optimal worst-case 
probability of detection and classification for the baseline scenario, followed by a 
sequence of restrictions removing each of the indicated platform types. 
 
 




































Figure 33.   Pacific Resources Versus Risk.  Each bar shows the optimal worst-case 
probability of detection and classification for the baseline scenario, followed by a 
sequence of restrictions removing each of the indicated platform types.   
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D IMPROVED INTELLEGENCE 
We now modify the Pacific baseline scenario to explore the effect of improved 
friendly intelligence on attacker goal cells.  We model this improved intelligence by 
reducing the number of goal cells to which the attacker can send his SPSS.  As shown in 
Figure 35, the number of goal cells is now the same and as the number of entry cells. 


























Figure 34.   Improved Intelligence Scenario Entry and Goal Cells. 
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5 0.45 0.3 0.28 0.21 0.02 0.35
6 0.96 0.93 1 0.97 1 0.79 1 0.34 0.12
7 0.92 0.9 1 1 1 0.87 0.65 0.33 0 0 0 0
8 0.43 0.31 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.56 0.37 0.12 0 0
9 0.25 0.19 0.2 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
10 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.03 0 0
11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0
12 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.13 1
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 0.25 0.89 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.26 0.81
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.23 0.27 0.44 0.62
18 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.13 0.49 0.82 0.29







Figure 35.   Pacific Improved Intelligence Scenario Overall Mixed Strategy.  In contrast to 
the baseline, having better intelligence that restricts the number of goal cells leads 
to suggested blockades of both entry and goal cells. 
Now that we have an equal number of entry and goal cells, we expend significant 
effort covering the areas surrounding both the entry and goal cells rather than 
concentrating most of the effort on the entry cells (Figure 36).  The improvement in 
intelligence improves probability of detection and classification from 0.86 to 0.89.  In the 
baseline scenario the defender is able to effectively cover the entry cells.  Given this 
effectiveness the ability to also cover the goal cells in the improved intelligence scenario 
only yields a small improvement over the baseline scenario. 
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E GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTION 
We modify the improved intelligence scenario to restrict the use of MPA and 
AEW aircraft to waters east of the Galapagos (column j14 and eastward).   




4 X X X X
5 X X X X X X X
6 X X X X X X X X X X X
7 X X X X X X X X X X X X
8 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
9 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
10 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
11 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
12 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
13 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.01 0.01
14 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.02 0.35 0.36 0.25 0.37
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0.01 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.01
16 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.12
17 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.02 0.17 0.12
18 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.13 0.45 0.16
19 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.24 0.51
20 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.12 0.2
21 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0.02
22 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
23 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
24 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
25 X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 36.   Pacific Geographic Restriction Scenario MPA Mixed Strategy.  Areas that 
cannot be searched by MPA or AEW are marked with an “X.” 
 48 




4 X X X X
5 X X X X X X X
6 X X X X X X X X X X X
7 X X X X X X X X X X X X
8 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
9 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
10 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
11 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
12 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
13 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0
14 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0.02 0.02 0.34 0.34
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.23 0.42 0.48 0.11
16 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.39 0.39 0.62 0.62 0.13
17 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.58 0.75 0.53 0.09
18 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.42 0.42 0.55 0.41
19 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.37 0.31 0.14
20 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01
21 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0.01 0.01
22 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0
23 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
24 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
25 X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 37.   Pacific Geographic Restriction Scenario AEW Mixed Strategy. 



























Figure 38.   Pacific Geographic Restriction Scenario Frigate Mixed Strategy. 
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Figure 39.   Pacific Geographic Restriction Scenario Submarine Mixed Strategy. 





5 0.46 0.52 0.38 0.19
6 1 0.99 1 0.95 1 0.73
7 0.71 0.7 0.75 0.95 0.91 0.53 0.36 0.06 0
8 0.28 0.27 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.2 0.07 0 0
9 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.03 0 0
10 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 0
11 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 0















Figure 40.   Pacific Geographic Restriction Scenario Seaweb Mixed Strategy. 
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5 0.46 0.52 0.38 0.19
6 1 0.99 1 0.95 1 1 0.62 0.18 0.03
7 0.71 0.7 0.75 0.95 0.91 0.53 0.36 0.06 0
8 0.28 0.27 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.2 0.07 0 0
9 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.03 0 0
10 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 0
11 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 0
12 0.01 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0.01 0.01
14 0 0 0.02 0.08 0.35 0.36 0.59 1
15 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.06 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.76 0.12
16 0 0 0 0.01 0.09 0.48 0.49 0.79 0.74 0.13
17 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.92 0.65 0.09
18 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.42 0.55 1 0.57
19 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.37 0.55 1
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.6
21 0 0 0 0.02 0.33





Figure 41.   Pacific Geographic Restriction Scenario Overall Mixed Strategy. 
We see from Figures 37-42 the defender adjusts to the restriction on AEW and 
MPA employment by using Seaweb exclusively in cells west of the Galapagos.  The 
defender also sends the frigate west for most of its mixed strategy covering two cells with 
high shipping density (see Appendix B).  The restriction reduces probability of detection 
and classification from 0.89 to 0.88. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis develops an operational level mission-planning aid to counter Self 
Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS) currently being used by drug smugglers in 
Colombia to move large volumes of cocaine to the Pacific coast of Mexico, and 
potentially to the Caribbean coast of the United States.  This planning aid suggests 
optimal placement and disposition of friendly search platforms while considering the 
intelligent response of the enemy SPSS operators to search efforts.  While we agree that a 
successful operation against an SPSS requires detection, classification, and interdiction, 
this planning aid addresses only detection and classification, arguably the more 
technically challenging problems. 
The planning aid uses a defender-attacker optimization model to maximize the 
defender’s probability of successful detection and classification of the SPSS through the 
advantageous disposition of these search platforms against an intelligent attacker 
operating the semi-submersible.  We assume the attacker operating the SPSS has 
imperfect knowledge of defender platform disposition but is aware that there are 
defenders that must be avoided.  Given this assumption, the solution to the defender-
attacker model is a mixed (i.e., probabilistic) strategy for the defender and a least-risk 
path for the attacker. 
We demonstrate our defender-attacker model with both an Eastern Pacific and 
Caribbean scenarios using five representative platform types whose detection and 
classification performance varies by platform, and by geography.  In all of these cases, 
we find that our model prescribes a face-valid defensive plan; defenders take advantage 
of geography by positioning at chokepoints in constrained waterways, and they provide 
coverage near attacker entry cells and goal cells in the less geographically-constrained 
scenarios.   
We evaluate the effect of removing each class of defender platform on the 
defender’s ability to detect and classify a transiting SPSS.  Given our sensor performance 
assumptions, the removal of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) has a much larger effect 
on detection and classification than removing any other platform.  We also demonstrate 
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the value of improved friendly intelligence:  in our example our prior knowledge allows 
focus on fewer goal cells.  This improved intelligence yields a corresponding 
improvement on probability of detection and classification.  This also results in the 
defender re-directing some search resources away from entry cells and toward the now 
easier-to-cover goal cells.  Finally we demonstrate the effect of a geographic restriction 
on flight operations of the MPA and AEW aircraft.  The defender adjusts by sending 
unrestricted platforms to cover areas that the aircraft cannot. 
The model solves our realistic sized scenarios in a few hours using commercially 
available linear programming optimization software.  We recommend further research 
into developing a heuristic that would solve these problems much faster without requiring 
licensed optimization software, and preferably on a Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
computer. 
We attempted to run the model assuming perfect attacker knowledge.  The 
resulting mixed integer program is very hard to solve.  We recommend further research 
aimed at improving runtime for this assumption.  We additionally recommend research 
into a tri-level model where the attacker has perfect knowledge of some sensor platform 
operation plans, but imperfect knowledge of others. 
The model ignores interaction between platforms.  We recommend further 
research into a model that improves combined performance when two or more platforms 
operating in close company. 
This thesis contains all data required for the interested reader to reproduce any of 
the experiments reported. 
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APPENDIX A.  SENSOR PLATFORM PERFORMANCE 
ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA 
This appendix presents the assumptions and data values used to determine both 
probability of detection and probability of classification.  These values will vary for each 
platform given the searcher’s employment decisions. 
ijc C∈
Indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
   cells with horizontal, vertical coordinates (alias c1, c2) [~500] 
m M∈   possible missions [~50,000] 
p P∈    defending platforms [~10] 
p TYPE P∈ ⊆  type of defending platform [5] 
pm M M∈ ⊆   missions platform p can perform [~10,000] 
pmc C C∈ ⊆   cells patrolled by platform p while performing mission m [~20] 
A. MOVING SEARCH PLATFORM TYPES 
Data [units] 
cfp,m,c coverage factor of platform p, performing mission m, in cell c  
[nondimensional]  
classp,c classification probability given detection of platform p in cell c 
[probability] 
depthc depth of a cell [nm] 
sizem number of cells in mission m [1-20] 
wp,c sweep width of a platform p searching in cell c [nm] 
vp speed of platform p [nm/hr] 
n number of sensors in a Seaweb network [10] 
The majority of the search platform types p TYPE P∈ ⊆  move within the cells 
they are assigned in a mission ,p mc C C∈ ⊆ .  These platforms are considered to be 
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searching randomly within these cells.  This is a conservative assumption.  With w being 
the sensor sweep width, v being the searcher’s speed and t being the time the attacker can 
transit a cell, and A being the area cell being searched, then by the random search formula 
(Wagner 1999 p.174): 
/1d
wvt AP e−= − . 
We call /wvt A  the coverage factor (cf).  We assume that random search sensors spread 
their effort evenly among the cells they are assigned.  Because all cells total an area 3600 
nm2, A becomes 3600*sizem where sizem=| pmC | is the number of cells assigned in a 
mission.  The SPSS can travel through a cell diagonally or rectilinearly (horizontally or 
vertically).  The transit length is 60 nm for an SPSS transiting rectilinearly.  We assume 
the SPSS speed is a constant 6 knots, so t is 10 hours for an SPSS traveling rectilinearly.  
Substituting the sweep of the platform in a given cell wp,c and the speed of the platform vp 
yields the following coverage factor: 
,, , *10 / (3600* )p c p mp m ccf w v size= . 
Which gives the probability of detection of , ,1 p m ccfe−−  for a rectilinear SPSS transit.  For 
a diagonal transit, we simply multiply cfp,m,c by 2 .  We assume random search 
platforms ignore any detections outside their assigned search cells.  Thus, the probability 
of detection outside the cells being searched is zero.  
1.  Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Platform Type 
We assume MPA to search at vmaritime patrol aircraft=180 nm/hr.  We assume radar is 
the primary search sensor for MPA.  There are several models of MPA employed by Joint 
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South with different radars of varying performance.    
The APS-137 is employed by both USCG C-130’s and some USN P-3’s and is chosen as 
the representative MPA radar.  Table 2 is used to determine APS-137 sweep width 
(wmaritime patrol aircraft,c) (USCG, 2004, pg. H-55). 
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Table 2.   APS-137 Sweep Widths (From USCG, 2004, pg. H-55). 
We assume MPA operating in 32nm radar range scale and the SPSS to have roughly the 
same radar cross section as a 17-25 foot recreational boat.  Surface winds will vary from 
cell to cell based upon the surface wind data presented in Appendix B. 
 We assume each MPA is capable of employing visual and infra-red (IR) sensors 
that are organic to the aircraft.  Thus, we assign MPA a high probability of classification 
given detection without the aid of other platforms.  We assume each MPA has a 
probability of classification given detection (classmaritime patrol aircraft,c) of 0.95 in cells with 
sparse shipping density, 0.9 in cells with moderate shipping density and 0.8 in cells with 
high shipping density. 
 We assume MPA is able to search up to 10 cells. 
2.  Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AEW) Aircraft Platform Type 
 We assume AEW aircraft to search at vairborne early warning aircraft =180 nm/hr.   Radar 
is the only search sensor for AEW.  There are several types of AEW aircraft employed by 
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South.  The APS-145 is employed by both U.S. 
Navy E-2’s and Customs and Border Patrol P-3’s and is chosen as the representative 
AEW radar.  We derive the APS-145 sweep width (wairborne early warning aircraft,c) from the 
APS-137 sweep width.  Radar range depends on a number of factors including target 
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radar cross section.  APS-145 and APS-137 have different radio frequencies and the radar 
cross section of a target does vary by radio frequency.  However, we assume that this 
difference in radar cross section is negligible.  Transmitted power of APS-137 is 
approximately 500 kW (Friedman, 2006, pg 210) and APS-145 is approximately 1 mW 
(Forecast International, 2006).  Based on the relative size of the radomes of MPA and 
AEW versions of the P-3 (Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, 2009) the APS-145 antenna area is 
roughly 20 times APS-137 antenna area.  Because radar range varies by the fourth root of 
antenna area and transmission power, a factor of 2.5 is applied to the APS-137 sweep 
width to obtain the estimated APS-145 sweep width (Wagner, 1999, pg 113).  
 AEW aircraft can only rely on radar for classification and have a relatively poor 
ability to classify targets.  We assume AEW aircraft have a probability of classification 
given detection (classairborne early warning aircraft,c) of 0.5 in cells with sparse shipping density, 
0.3 in cells with moderate shipping density and 0.1 in cells with high shipping density. 
 We assume AEW aircraft are able to search up to 10 cells. 
3.  Frigate Platform Type 
We assume frigates search at vfrigate =10 nm/hr.  Passive towed array sonar is 
assumed to be the frigate’s primary search sensor.  We assume sweep width (wfrigate,c) of 
the towed array is 10 nm in cells with poor acoustic conditions, 15 nm with moderate 
acoustic conditions and 30 nm with good acoustic conditions.   
Frigates are equipped with embarked helicopters to aid in classification.   Thus, 
we assume the probability of classification given detection (classfrigate,c) is 0.95 in cells 
with sparse shipping density, 0.9 in cells with moderate shipping density, and 0.8 in cells 
with high shipping density. 
We assume frigates are able to search up to three cells. 
4.  Submarine Platform Type. 
Submarines are assumed to be searching at vsubmarine =10 nm/hr.  We assume the 
hull mounted passive sonar is the submarine’s primary search sensor.  We assume sweep 
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width (wsubmarine,c) of the towed array is 10 nm in cells with poor acoustic conditions, 15 
nm with moderate acoustic conditions and 30nm with good acoustic conditions.   
We assume submarines are able to search up to three cells. 
 Submarines can only rely on acoustic data for classification and have a relatively 
poor ability to classify targets.  We assume submarines have a probability of 
classification given detection (classsubmarine,c) of 0.5 in cells with sparse shipping density, 
0.3 in cells with moderate shipping density and 0.1 in cells with high shipping density. 
B.  SEAWEB PLATFORM TYPE 
Seaweb is a proposed autonomous network of acoustic sensors that communicate 
with each other through acoustic modems.  Data from these sensors is routed to a 
gateway buoy that communicates to operators through radio or satellite signal.  A Seaweb 
sensor deployed in deep water is expected to have detection ranges of approximately 10 
times the water depth (10*depthc) against noisy targets such as SPSS (Rice, 2008).  We 
use the random search formula to calculate the probability of detection.  This results in a 
conservative estimate of the probability of detection. Unlike the moving search sensors 
the Seaweb network is fixed within a cell once it is installed.  As a result the speed of the 
SPSS is used (v=6 knots) in the calculation.  As in the moving search platforms, 10 hours 
is used for t for rectilinear SPSS transits.  We define n as the total number of sensors in a 
Seaweb network.  We assume a Seaweb search sensor’s sweep width is 10*depthc.  
Assuming the n sensors in a Seaweb network are spread evenly in the sizem assigned cells 
results in the following: 
, , (10* )*6*10 / (3600* )c mseaweb m ccf n depth size= . 




−  for a rectilinear SPSS transit.  
We assume Seaweb sensors ignore any detections outside their assigned search cells.  
Thus, the probability of detection outside the cells where Seaweb sensors are deployed is 
zero.  We assume Seaweb has a probability of classification given detection (classseaweb,c) 
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of 0.5 in cells with sparse shipping density, 0.3 in cells with moderate shipping density 
and 0.1 in cells with high shipping density. 
We assume the sensors are deployed in a manner that allows communication with 
a gateway buoy.  A Seaweb network can be deployed in as many as n cells.  n=10 for all 
scenarios in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX B.  GEOGRAPHIC MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA  
This appendix presents the assumptions and data used to determine how 
probability of detection and probability of classification vary by geographic location.  We 
divide seaspace into 60nm by 60nm square cells.  The attacker chooses a directed path 
from an advantageous entry cell node to an advantageous goal cell node.  Those cells 
with an “X” in Figures 43 and 44 depict areas that are non-navigable and cannot be used 
by the defender and can only be used by the attacker if they are entry cells.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 X X X X X X
2 X X X X X X
3 X X X X X X X
4 X X X X X X X
5 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
6 X X X
7 X X
8 X X X X X X
9 X X X X X X X
10 X X X X X X
11 X X X X X X
12 X X X X X X X X
13 X X X X X X X X X X X X
14 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 42.   Useable cells in the Caribbean.  Cells marked “X” are non-navigable and 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 X X X X X X X X X X X
2 X X X X X X X X X X X
3 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
4 X X X X X X X X X X X X
5 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
6 X X X X X X X X X X
7 X X X X X X X X X
8 X X X X X
9 X X X X
10 X X X
11 X X X X
12 X X X X X X X






19 X X X
20 X X X X
21 X X X X X
22 X X X X X X X
23 X X X X X
24 X X X X
25 X X X X X  
Figure 43.   Useable cells in the Pacific.  Cells marked “X” are non-navigable and cannot 
be used by the defender and can only be used by the attacker if they are entry 
cells. 
A. SHIPPING DENSITY 
We assume shipping density influences probability of classification.  It is more 
difficult to correctly identify an SPSS if is among other shipping than if it is transiting an 
area alone.  Different types of shipping make classification difficult for different types of 
sensors.  For example, sailboats may look very similar to an SPSS on radar while fishing 
boats may sound similar to an SPSS on acoustic sensors.  We ignore the effect of 
different types of shipping by assuming that the shipping densities we use convert to an 
equal number of ships that might confuse radar or acoustic sensors.  Figures 45 and 46 
show a one-month plot of ships that report metrological data to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) through the Shipboard Environmental data 
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Acquisition System (SEAS) that we use to decide which cells have high, moderate, or 
sparse shipping densities (NOAA, 2008).  We then assign a 3 for high shipping density 2 
for moderate and 1 for sparse in the shipping density model. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 1 1 2 3 3 X X X X X X 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1
2 X X X 3 3 3 X 1 1 1 X X 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
3 X X X 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 X X X X 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
4 X X X 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 X X X X 1 2 3 3 1
5 X X X 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 X X 3 X X X X X X X 2 X X 3
6 X X 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 X 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
7 X X 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
8 X X X X X X 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 X X X X X X X 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 X X X X X X 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 X X X X X 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 X 2 1 1 1 1 1
12 X X X X 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 X X 1 X X 1 1 1 1
13 X X X 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 X X X X X X X X X 1 1
14 X X X 1 1 X X 1 1 X X X X X X X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 44.   SEAS Data and Corresponding Caribbean Shipping Density Model.  Densities 
are scored with discrete values from 1 (low) to 3 (high) (From NOAA, 2008). 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 X X X X X X X X X X X
2 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
3 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
4 1 1 3 3 X X X X X X X X X X X X
5 1 1 1 1 3 3 X X X 1 X X X X X X X X X X
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 2 X X X X X X X X X X
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 X X X X X
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 X X X X
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 X X X
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 X X X X
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 X X X X X X X
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 X X 3 X X X
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 X X
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 X
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 X
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 X
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 X X
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 X X X
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 X X X X
21 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 X 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 X X X X
22 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 X X 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 X X X X X
23 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 X X X X X
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 X X X X
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 X X X X X  
Figure 45.   SEAS Data and Corresponding Pacific Shipping Density Model.  Density 
scores vary from 1 (low) to 3 (high) (From NOAA, 2008). 
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B. SURFACE WINDS  
As discussed in Appendix A, surface winds influence radar sweep widths.  We 
use a 10-day average of surface winds taken from Special Sensor Microwave/Imager 
(SSM/I) satellite data as a representative wind distribution for both the Caribbean and 
Pacific (NOAA, 2009). 
 
Figure 46.   10-Day Average Wind Feb 06 2009 (From: NOAA, 2009).. 
 
We use the 10-day average winds from Figure 47 to construct the wind models shown in 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 15 15 20 20 15 X X X X X X 25 15 15 15 20 20 20 15 15 10 10 15 15 15
2 X X X 20 15 15 X 15 15 15 X X 15 25 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 15 15 15
3 X X X 15 10 15 10 15 15 15 20 X X X X 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 15 15
4 X X X 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 15 10 20 20 X X X X 15 15 20 15 15
5 X X X 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 X X 10 X X X X X X X 15 X X 15
6 X X 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 20 15 15 15 15 20 X 20 15 15 15 25 15 15
7 X X 15 20 20 20 10 15 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
8 X X X X X X 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 15 15 20 20 20 15 15 15 15 15
9 X X X X X X X 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 20 15 15 20 20 20 20 15 15 15
10 X X X X X X 15 15 15 20 15 15 20 20 20 15 20 20 20 20 20 15 15 15
11 X X X X X 15 15 15 15 15 20 20 15 15 15 15 X 20 25 20 15 15 15
12 X X X X 10 15 15 15 15 15 20 15 25 X X 15 X X 20 20 15 15
13 X X X 10 10 10 15 15 15 20 X X X X X X X X X 15 15
14 X X X 10 15 X X 25 25 X X X X X X X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 47.   Caribbean Wind Model (average wind in knots). 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 X X X X X X X X X X X
2 10 X X X X X X X X X X X
3 10 10 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
4 10 10 20 10 X X X X X X X X X X X X
5 10 10 10 5 5 10 X X X 25 X X X X X X X X X X
6 10 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 20 20 10 X X X X X X X X X X
7 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 20 10 10 10 X X X X X X X X X
8 10 1 10 10 10 10 10 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 20 X X X X X
9 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 X X X X
10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 15 15 10 15 15 20 X X X
11 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 15 15 10 10 15 20 X X X X
12 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 X X X X X X X
13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 10 10 15 X X 20 X X X
14 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 15 15 15 10 10 X X
15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 15 10 5 10 X
16 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 X
17 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 X
18 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 10 10 10 X X
19 10 10 10 5 5 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 X X X
20 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 X X X X
21 10 5 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 X 15 10 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 X X X X
22 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 X X 15 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 X X X X X
23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 X X X X X
24 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 X X X X
25 10 15 15 15 15 10 10 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 X X X X X  
Figure 48.   Pacific Wind Model (average wind in knots). 
C. WATER DEPTH 
As discussed in Appendix A, water depth influences Seaweb sensor performance.  
Water depth data from Google Earth 5.0 is used to build the water depth models in 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 1 9 1 94 38 X X X X X X 7 14 30 49 35 82 148 178 180 178 185 187 188 189
2 X X X 75 139 144 X 132 13 11 X X 40 56 28 5 88 145 182 177 183 180 176 186 184
3 X X X 3 110 141 102 105 74 36 24 X X X X 25 1 23 70 16 251 237 252 224 225
4 X X X 144 126 130 105 90 36 61 102 83 89 88 23 4 X X X X 118 94 102 83 71
5 X X X 142 88 94 109 112 71 73 51 X X 45 X X X X X X X 11 X X 1
6 X X 117 117 90 63 56 23 24 22 5 33 43 58 97 128 95 X 129 139 14 138 132 112 57
7 X X 10 12 5 3 1 3 4 28 27 53 67 79 97 126 119 100 127 133 138 148 158 151 135
8 X X X X X X 1 9 34 58 83 95 111 122 136 117 108 127 133 136 146 159 157 140 102
9 X X X X X X X 2 44 73 98 125 131 132 138 129 116 125 133 135 146 159 157 141 106
10 X X X X X X 8 53 100 95 121 120 126 130 104 67 43 43 80 83 149 165 131 100
11 X X X X X 30 36 84 107 104 111 107 105 85 50 10 X 5 16 19 100 51 78
12 X X X X 56 77 92 102 105 112 98 14 3 X X 1 X X 6 38 14 2
13 X X X 6 53 52 52 69 68 3 X X X X X X X X X 1 1
14 X X X 11 6 X X 4 10 X X X X X X X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 X X X X X X X X X X X
2 28 X X X X X X X X X X X
3 85 86 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
4 97 103 131 96 X X X X X X X X X X X X
5 98 118 122 106 74 57 X X X 2 X X X X X X X X X X
6 119 109 112 112 112 115 106 65 83 50 20 X X X X X X X X X X
7 93 103 108 110 110 109 113 120 133 148 117 36 X X X X X X X X X
8 98 101 107 110 109 113 124 134 135 139 115 104 98 68 44 1 X X X X X
9 99 103 107 110 110 120 132 135 136 133 131 127 130 128 96 54 22 X X X X
10 99 104 108 112 116 126 131 132 134 133 130 128 123 119 115 108 65 15 X X X
11 99 110 114 117 124 130 132 131 129 127 128 129 123 121 119 114 98 55 X X X X
12 100 104 110 114 119 124 126 129 125 123 120 118 117 118 116 114 107 98 51 38 X X X X X X X
13 103 99 103 109 114 119 120 125 121 119 116 113 117 118 114 114 108 99 88 77 50 7 X X 9 X X X
14 109 100 103 109 113 115 118 120 120 119 117 116 119 120 114 113 109 102 89 61 54 61 31 51 88 109 X X
15 110 105 107 110 114 115 117 119 119 119 117 108 115 118 113 94 88 78 59 89 90 90 35 60 99 115 35 X
16 113 107 108 108 109 107 108 116 116 114 111 104 103 108 104 85 74 57 61 96 103 102 55 54 96 112 36 X
17 116 109 108 106 102 89 96 111 112 109 104 103 98 92 87 74 60 55 83 96 106 108 109 78 99 108 14 X
18 113 108 108 109 106 106 108 111 106 98 88 89 85 77 71 68 68 82 92 109 115 110 106 121 140 6 X X
19 113 110 112 112 111 111 109 105 100 93 84 86 76 69 68 75 83 88 95 104 113 112 102 113 56 X X X
20 114 110 111 113 111 112 106 103 102 94 88 88 79 52 56 66 84 88 93 98 105 102 86 22 X X X X
21 116 110 107 104 97 106 109 108 108 108 106 98 52 X 31 62 80 86 91 99 93 73 51 21 X X X X
22 115 108 105 106 108 110 110 109 109 103 97 107 41 X X 10 51 73 85 72 58 59 10 X X X X X
23 116 108 107 108 110 113 113 112 114 108 100 109 110 110 55 63 60 82 93 87 95 73 96 X X X X X
24 116 108 108 110 112 115 117 118 119 111 107 111 111 108 104 107 106 104 106 103 103 101 133 40 X X X X
25 109 113 110 109 118 116 122 120 117 119 121 121 121 120 115 115 116 119 112 110 112 117 70 X X X X X  
Figure 50.   Pacific Water Depth Model (average depth in hundreds of feet). 
D. ACOUSTIC CONDITIONS 
 The performance of passive acoustic sensors such as a towed-array sonar or a 
submarine’s hull-mounted sonar depend on a number of factors.  We only consider a few 
of these to help build a representative distribution of cells with good, moderate and poor 
acoustic conditions for both of our geographic areas of interest.  The factors considered 
are shipping density, wind, and water depth.  Higher shipping density results in higher 
ambient noise that degrades acoustic sensor performance.  Higher winds lead to higher 
sea states that also increase the ambient noise.  Shallow water has less favorable acoustic 
conditions than deeper water.  In order to combine all these factors, we assign a 1, 2 or 3 
for each factor.  We have already expressed shipping density in this manner.  For wind, 
we assign 1 for average winds less than or equal to 10 knots, a 2 for winds greater than 10 
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knots and less than or equal to 20 knots, and 3 for winds greater than 20 knots.  For water 
depth, we assign 1 for average water depth greater than or equal to 5,000 feet, a 2 for 
water depth less than 5,000 and greater than or equal to 1,000 feet, and 3 for water depth 
less than 1,000 feet.  We add these three factors to obtain the acoustic condition models 
in Figures 52 and 53.  We consider numbers in the range 3-5 to represent good acoustic 
conditions, 6-7 to represent moderate acoustic conditions, and 8-9 to represent poor 
acoustic conditions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 6 6 8 7 7 X X X X X X 9 5 5 5 7 5 5 4 6 3 3 4 4 4
2 X X X 7 6 6 X 4 5 5 X X 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 4
3 X X X 8 3 5 3 4 4 5 6 X X X X 7 6 5 4 5 3 5 3 4 4
4 X X X 6 4 4 5 5 6 5 4 6 5 4 8 7 X X X X 4 5 7 6 4
5 X X X 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 X X 6 X X X X X X X 6 X X 8
6 X X 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 5 4 5 4 5 X 5 5 6 4 5 4 4
7 X X 7 7 8 8 6 7 7 6 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4
8 X X X X X X 5 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 6 5 4 4 4 4 4
9 X X X X X X X 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4
10 X X X X X X 6 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 7 5 5 5 4 4 4
11 X X X X X 5 6 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 7 X 8 6 6 4 4 4
12 X X X X 3 5 4 5 4 5 6 6 9 X X 6 X X 7 6 5 6
13 X X X 6 4 4 6 5 4 7 X X X X X X X X X 6 6
14 X X X 4 6 X X 7 7 X X X X X X X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 51.   Caribbean Acoustic Condition Model.  Cell entries in the range 3-5 represent 



















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 X X X X X X X X X X X
2 5 X X X X X X X X X X X
3 3 4 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
4 3 3 7 5 X X X X X X X X X X X X
5 3 3 3 3 5 5 X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X
6 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 5 X X X X X X X X X X
7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 4 3 5 X X X X X X X X X
8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 8 X X X X X
9 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 7 X X X X
10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 7 X X X
11 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 5 7 X X X X
12 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 X X X X X X X
13 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 8 X X 9 X X X
14 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 7 6 5 3 X X
15 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 X
16 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 X
17 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 X
18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 5 X X
19 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 X X X
20 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 5 X X X X
21 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 X 5 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 5 X X X X
22 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 X X 6 3 4 3 3 3 3 5 X X X X X
23 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 X X X X X
24 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 X X X X
25 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 X X X X X  
Figure 52.   Pacific Acoustic Condition Model.    Cell entries in the range 3-5 represent 
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